Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies

DOI10.1145/1109557.1109674zbMath1192.91097OpenAlexW4249737710MaRDI QIDQ3583422

Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov

Publication date: 16 August 2010

Published in: Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm - SODA '06 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1109557.1109674

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Mechanism Design ⋮ Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions ⋮ Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design

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