Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies

DOI10.1145/1109557.1109674zbMATH Open1192.91097OpenAlexW4249737710MaRDI QIDQ3583422FDOQ3583422

Authors: Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov 

Publication date: 16 August 2010

Published in: Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm - SODA '06 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1109557.1109674

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (5)

• Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
• Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
• Black-box reductions in mechanism design
• Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
• Mechanism design

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