Mechanism design

DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_327MaRDI QIDQ5149740zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ron Lavi

Publication date 15 February 2021

Published in Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_327

zbMATH Keywords

auction theorygame theorymechanism designsocial designer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
• Communication in Mechanism Design
• Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
• Bayesian Mechanism Design
• Optimal combinatorial mechanism design

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Incentives in Teams
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(29)

• Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
• The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
• Auctions, market mechanisms and their applications. First international ICST conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8--9, 2009. Revised Selected Papers
• Mechanism design for land acquisition
• Nobel, Milgrom and Wilson
• Mechanism design for pandemics
• Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz
• Mechanism design with a restricted action space
• Mechanism design and intentions
• Auctions, bidding and exchange design
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343725 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mechanism Design by Creditability
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1004910 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966911 (Why is no real title available?)
• One-dimensional mechanism design
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1842061 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mechanism design with aftermarkets: cutoff mechanisms
• Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
• Contextual mechanism design
• An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2226165 (Why is no real title available?)
• Automated mechanism design: a new application area for search algorithms
• Communication in Mechanism Design
• A parametrization of the auction design space
• Mechanism design with model specification
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• Optimization and mechanism design

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