Mechanism design
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Publication:5149740
DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_327zbMATH Open1454.91055OpenAlexW4248217320MaRDI QIDQ5149740FDOQ5149740
Authors: Ron Lavi 
Publication date: 15 February 2021
Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_327
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
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- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
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- Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
- Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
Cited In (29)
- Optimization and mechanism design
- Auctions, market mechanisms and their applications. First international ICST conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8--9, 2009. Revised Selected Papers
- Communication in Mechanism Design
- Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz
- Auctions, bidding and exchange design
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Mechanism design and intentions
- Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
- One-dimensional mechanism design
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Mechanism design with model specification
- Mechanism design for land acquisition
- Nobel, Milgrom and Wilson
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- Contextual mechanism design
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Automated mechanism design: a new application area for search algorithms
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- Mechanism design with aftermarkets: cutoff mechanisms
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
- Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- Mechanism design for pandemics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A parametrization of the auction design space
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Mechanism Design by Creditability
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