Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results

DOI10.1007/S12046-008-0008-3zbMATH Open1167.91353OpenAlexW2099466503MaRDI QIDQ1001137FDOQ1001137

Dinesh Garg, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari

Publication date: 12 February 2009

Published in: Sādhanā (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12046-008-0008-3

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryauctionsMechanism designsocial choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited In (4)

• On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition
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• Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
• Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities

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