Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
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Publication:1001137
DOI10.1007/S12046-008-0008-3zbMATH Open1167.91353OpenAlexW2099466503MaRDI QIDQ1001137FDOQ1001137
Dinesh Garg, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
Publication date: 12 February 2009
Published in: Sādhanā (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12046-008-0008-3
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