scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6469241
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Publication:5501360
zbMATH Open1318.68065MaRDI QIDQ5501360FDOQ5501360
Authors: Tim Roughgarden 
Publication date: 3 August 2015
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20) Games involving graphs (91A43)
Cited In (61)
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- Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach
- Optimal evacuation solutions for large-scale scenarios
- On the Braess paradox with nonlinear dynamics and control theory
- Equilibria for two parallel links: the strong price of anarchy versus the price of anarchy
- Resolving Braess's paradox in random networks
- Parametric packing of selfish items and the subset sum algorithm
- New complexity results and algorithms for the minimum tollbooth problem
- Coincident cost improvement vs. Degradation by adding connections to noncooperative networks and distributed systems
- Inefficiency of logit-based stochastic user equilibrium in a traffic network under ATIS
- Cost sharing in networks: some open questions
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- Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
- Efficiency of atomic splittable selfish routing with polynomial cost functions
- The effect of supplier capacity on the supply chain profit
- A network efficiency measure with application to critical infrastructure networks
- Advances in dynamic traffic assignment: TAC. A new relationship between Wardrop's user equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- The cost of selfishness for maximizing the minimum load on uniformly related machines
- Sensitivity analysis for convex separable optimization over integral polymatroids
- Optimal routing and charging of energy-limited vehicles in traffic networks
- Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality
- The path player game
- Adaptive routing with stale information
- Price of Anarchy in Networks with Heterogeneous Latency Functions
- Degrading network capacity may improve performance: private versus public monitoring in the Braess paradox
- Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players
- On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games
- Hierarchical models of warfare
- Atomic routing games on maximum congestion
- Complexity and optimality of the best response algorithm in random potential games
- Incentive compatible and globally efficient position based routing for selfish reverse multicast in wireless sensor networks
- Management of Variable Data Streams in Networks
- Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
- Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks
- On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
- A note on a selfish bin packing problem
- Demand allocation with latency cost functions
- Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow
- Inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in series-parallel network congestion games
- Topological implications of selfish neighbor selection in unstructured peer-to-peer networks
- Bottleneck congestion games with logarithmic price of anarchy
- Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons
- Price of stability in survivable network design
- Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
- Fragile networks: identifying vulnerabilities and synergies in an uncertain age
- A relative total cost index for the evaluation of transportation network robustness in the presence of degradable links and alternative travel behavior
- Incentive-based search for equilibria in Boolean games
- Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy for flows over time
- Truthful mechanisms for selfish routing and two-parameter agents
- Greedy versus social: resource-competing oscillator network as a model of amoeba-based neurocomputer
- Bounding the inefficiency of the C-logit stochastic user equilibrium assignment
- Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types
- The internet, evolutionary variational inequalities, and the time-dependent Braess paradox
- A continuous theory of traffic congestion and Wardrop equilibria
- Computer science and decision theory
- Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games
- Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
- Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
- Braess's Paradox in large random graphs
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