scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6469241
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Publication:5501360
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(61)- Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach
- Computer-aided verification for mechanism design
- On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games
- Complexity and optimality of the best response algorithm in random potential games
- Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
- The path player game
- A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time
- Incentive-based search for equilibria in Boolean games
- Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy for flows over time
- Truthful mechanisms for selfish routing and two-parameter agents
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Adaptive routing with stale information
- Incentive compatible and globally efficient position based routing for selfish reverse multicast in wireless sensor networks
- A continuous theory of traffic congestion and Wardrop equilibria
- Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types
- Demand allocation with latency cost functions
- Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
- Sensitivity analysis for convex separable optimization over integral polymatroids
- Optimal routing and charging of energy-limited vehicles in traffic networks
- Price of Anarchy in Networks with Heterogeneous Latency Functions
- New complexity results and algorithms for the minimum tollbooth problem
- Computer science and decision theory
- Inefficiency of logit-based stochastic user equilibrium in a traffic network under ATIS
- Bottleneck congestion games with logarithmic price of anarchy
- Equilibria for two parallel links: the strong price of anarchy versus the price of anarchy
- Inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in series-parallel network congestion games
- Management of Variable Data Streams in Networks
- Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
- The internet, evolutionary variational inequalities, and the time-dependent Braess paradox
- Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games
- Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow
- Cost sharing in networks: some open questions
- Atomic routing games on maximum congestion
- Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons
- Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality
- Optimal evacuation solutions for large-scale scenarios
- Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
- Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks
- Efficiency of atomic splittable selfish routing with polynomial cost functions
- On the Braess paradox with nonlinear dynamics and control theory
- On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
- Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players
- Fragile networks: identifying vulnerabilities and synergies in an uncertain age
- Greedy versus social: resource-competing oscillator network as a model of amoeba-based neurocomputer
- Resolving Braess's paradox in random networks
- Bounding the inefficiency of the C-logit stochastic user equilibrium assignment
- Hierarchical models of warfare
- The cost of selfishness for maximizing the minimum load on uniformly related machines
- Parametric packing of selfish items and the subset sum algorithm
- A relative total cost index for the evaluation of transportation network robustness in the presence of degradable links and alternative travel behavior
- Braess's Paradox in large random graphs
- Degrading network capacity may improve performance: private versus public monitoring in the Braess paradox
- A network efficiency measure with application to critical infrastructure networks
- A note on a selfish bin packing problem
- Price of stability in survivable network design
- Advances in dynamic traffic assignment: TAC. A new relationship between Wardrop's user equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
- Topological implications of selfish neighbor selection in unstructured peer-to-peer networks
- Coincident cost improvement vs. Degradation by adding connections to noncooperative networks and distributed systems
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
- The effect of supplier capacity on the supply chain profit
- Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective
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