Publication:5501360
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zbMath1318.68065MaRDI QIDQ5501360
Publication date: 3 August 2015
91A43: Games involving graphs
68R10: Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science
90B10: Deterministic network models in operations research
68M20: Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems
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