scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6469241

Publication date: 3 August 2015

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Games involving graphs (91A43) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20)

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