Interplay between Security Providers, Consumers, and Attackers: A Weighted Congestion Game Approach
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Publication:3098095
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_8zbMath1350.68025OpenAlexW2137751290MaRDI QIDQ3098095
Peter Reichl, Bruno Tuffin, Patrick Maillé
Publication date: 11 November 2011
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_8
Noncooperative games (91A10) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
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- Weighted congestion games with separable preferences
- Potential games
- Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
- Large population potential games
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- Of Threats and Costs: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Security Risk Management
- Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion
- Congestion Games with Player-Specific Constants
- Weighted Congestion Games: Price of Anarchy, Universal Worst-Case Examples, and Tightness
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The “Price of Anarchy” Under Nonlinear and Asymmetric Costs
- Potential games with continuous player sets
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