Truthful mechanisms for selfish routing and two-parameter agents
DOI10.1007/S00224-010-9281-8zbMATH Open1278.91035OpenAlexW2097738267MaRDI QIDQ647482FDOQ647482
Authors: Clemens Thielen, Sven O. Krumke 
Publication date: 23 November 2011
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:hbz:386-kluedo-15872
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Cites Work
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- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (extended abstract)
- Sensitivity analysis for the asymmetric network equilibrium problem
- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games
Cited In (4)
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