Degrading network capacity may improve performance: private versus public monitoring in the Braess paradox
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Publication:453657
DOI10.1007/S11238-010-9237-0zbMATH Open1248.90035OpenAlexW1977459653MaRDI QIDQ453657FDOQ453657
Authors: Eyran J. Gisches, Amnon Rapoport 
Publication date: 27 September 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9237-0
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Cites Work
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- Network architecture and traffic flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess paradoxes
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- Braess Paradox in the Laboratory: Experimental Study of Route Choice in Traffic Networks with Asymmetric Costs
- The Prevalence of Paradoxes in Transportation Equilibrium Problems
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Cited In (4)
- Dynamics of a 2D piecewise linear Braess paradox model: effect of the third partition
- Dynamics in braess paradox with nonimpulsive commuters
- Network architecture and traffic flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess paradoxes
- Informational Braess' paradox: the effect of information on traffic congestion
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