Degrading network capacity may improve performance: private versus public monitoring in the Braess paradox
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Publication:453657
DOI10.1007/s11238-010-9237-0zbMath1248.90035OpenAlexW1977459653MaRDI QIDQ453657
Eyran J. Gisches, Amnon Rapoport
Publication date: 27 September 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9237-0
Games involving graphs (91A43) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (2)
Dynamics of a 2D Piecewise Linear Braess Paradox Model: Effect of the Third Partition ⋮ Dynamics in braess paradox with nonimpulsive commuters
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