Network architecture and traffic flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess paradoxes
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
- Braess Paradox in the Laboratory: Experimental Study of Route Choice in Traffic Networks with Asymmetric Costs
- Braess-like paradoxes in distributed computer systems
- Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess paradox
- Commuters route choice behaviour
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- On the relationship between Nash—Cournot and Wardrop equilibria
- The Braess paradox
- Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
Cited in
(6)- Dynamics in braess paradox with nonimpulsive commuters
- Braess Paradox in the Laboratory: Experimental Study of Route Choice in Traffic Networks with Asymmetric Costs
- An experiment on lowest unique integer games
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