Network architecture and traffic flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess paradoxes

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.012zbMath1161.90351OpenAlexW2118124862MaRDI QIDQ1021602

J. Martínez

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.012

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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Cites Work

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• Commuters route choice behaviour
• Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess paradox
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• Braess-like paradoxes in distributed computer systems
• Braess Paradox in the Laboratory: Experimental Study of Route Choice in Traffic Networks with Asymmetric Costs
• On the relationship between Nash—Cournot and Wardrop equilibria
• The Braess paradox
• Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung

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