A paradox of congestion in a queuing network
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5750076
DOI10.2307/3214558zbMath0718.60105OpenAlexW2053318772WikidataQ96323485 ScholiaQ96323485MaRDI QIDQ5750076
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/6d4a15f6899db00a9655af36ed886a87f6cd1343
Related Items
Coincident cost improvement vs. Degradation by adding connections to noncooperative networks and distributed systems, Probabilistic selfish routing in parallel batch and single-server queues, User equilibria for a parallel queueing system with state dependent routing, Optimization via trunk reservation in single resource loss systems under heavy traffic, Customer equilibrium and optimal strategies in Markovian queues in series, Monotonicity properties of user equilibrium policies for parallel batch systems, Degrading network capacity may improve performance: private versus public monitoring in the Braess paradox, Dynamics in braess paradox with nonimpulsive commuters, Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers, EFFECTS OF SYMMETRY ON GLOBALIZING SEPARATED MONOPOLIES TO A NASH-COURNOT OLIGOPOLY, Quasi-Newton smoothed functional algorithms for unconstrained and constrained simulation optimization, On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard, Locating inefficient links in a large-scale transportation network, A Paradox for Admission Control of Multiclass Queueing Network with Differentiated Service, Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess paradox, Non-cooperative queueing games on a network of single server queues, The Downs-Thomson Effect in a Markov Process, User-Optimal State-Dependent Routeing in Parallel Tandem Queues with Loss, A survey on networking games in telecommunications, A paradox in optimal flow control of \(M/M/n\) queues, The Downs-Thomson paradox: existence, uniqueness and stability of user equilibria, Cooperation and self-interest: Pareto-inefficiency of Nash equilibria in finite random games
