Effects of symmetry on globalizing separated monopolies to a Nash-Cournot oligopoly

DOI10.1142/S0219198912500090zbMATH Open1258.91018MaRDI QIDQ4908591FDOQ4908591

Authors: Hisao Kameda, Takashi Ui 

Publication date: 6 March 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriummonopolyprisoners' dilemmaconsumer surplusoligopolyBraess paradoxPareto inefficiencyproducer profit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• The Braess paradox
• Numerical studies on a paradox for non-cooperative static load balancing in distributed computer systems
• A paradox of congestion in a queuing network
• Braess-like paradoxes in distributed computer systems
• Paradoxes in distributed decisions on optimal load balancing for networks of homogeneous computers
• Coincident cost improvement vs. Degradation by adding connections to noncooperative networks and distributed systems

Cited In (2)

• Magnitude of inefficiency
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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