Effects of symmetry on globalizing separated monopolies to a Nash-Cournot oligopoly

DOI10.1142/S0219198912500090MaRDI QIDQ4908591zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hisao Kameda, Takashi Ui

Publication date 6 March 2013

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198912500090

zbMATH Keywords

Braess paradoxconsumer surplusmonopolyNash equilibriumoligopolyPareto inefficiencyprisoners' dilemmaproducer profit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841918
• On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets
• A comparison of Bertrand and Cournot profits in oligopolies with differentiated products
• Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48312

Cites work

• A paradox of congestion in a queuing network
• Braess-like paradoxes in distributed computer systems
• Coincident cost improvement vs. Degradation by adding connections to noncooperative networks and distributed systems
• Numerical studies on a paradox for non-cooperative static load balancing in distributed computer systems
• Paradoxes in distributed decisions on optimal load balancing for networks of homogeneous computers
• The Braess paradox

Cited in

(2)

• Magnitude of inefficiency
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841918 (Why is no real title available?)

This page was built for publication: Effects of symmetry on globalizing separated monopolies to a Nash-Cournot oligopoly

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4908591)