Probabilistic selfish routing in parallel batch and single-server queues

DOI10.1007/s11134-017-9558-6zbMath1390.90264OpenAlexW2768338101MaRDI QIDQ1649977

Y. Aharonov

Publication date: 29 June 2018

Published in: Queueing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11134-017-9558-6

zbMATH Keywords

queueing networkparallel queuesuser equilibriaBraess paradoxWardrop's equilibriumDowns-Thomson paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

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Cites Work

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