Avoiding the Braess paradox in non-cooperative networks

DOI10.1239/jap/1032374242zbMath0942.60091MaRDI QIDQ4261298

Ariel Orda, Aurel A. Lazar, Yannis A. Korilis

Publication date: 21 August 2000

Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0610fdc353379e1dfc3735be01769cdeaf31b257

zbMATH Keywords

non-cooperative games; routing; computer communication networks; Braess paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90B18: Communication networks in operations research

68M10: Network design and communication in computer systems

60K30: Applications of queueing theory (congestion, allocation, storage, traffic, etc.)

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