Cooperation and self-interest: Pareto-inefficiency of Nash equilibria in finite random games
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Publication:4230626
DOI10.1073/pnas.95.17.9724zbMath0911.90369OpenAlexW2008061812WikidataQ36275351 ScholiaQ36275351MaRDI QIDQ4230626
Publication date: 8 February 1999
Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.95.17.9724
Nash equilibriumcooperation in societiesfinite random gamesmutualism in biologysimulations of two player games
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