Cooperation and self-interest: Pareto-inefficiency of Nash equilibria in finite random games

DOI10.1073/pnas.95.17.9724zbMath0911.90369OpenAlexW2008061812WikidataQ36275351 ScholiaQ36275351MaRDI QIDQ4230626

Joel E. Cohen

Publication date: 8 February 1999

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.95.17.9724

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcooperation in societiesfinite random gamesmutualism in biologysimulations of two player games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (4)

Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games ⋮ Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games ⋮ Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management ⋮ Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games

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• Probability of a pure equilibrium point in n-person games
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• On the probability of existence of pure equilibria in matrix games

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