Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0309-3zbMath1244.91017OpenAlexW2074569793MaRDI QIDQ444148

Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0309-3

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremBraess's paradoxprivate monitoringpublic monitoringanonymous gamescalendar strategycontagion strategynetwork routing gamesstrategic complexity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

A note on social learning in non-atomic routing games, Social learning in nonatomic routing games, Equilibrium routing under uncertainty

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