Social learning in nonatomic routing games
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Publication:2078068
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.003zbMath1483.91147arXiv2009.11580OpenAlexW4206135419MaRDI QIDQ2078068
Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.11580
Discrete-time games (91A50) Games involving graphs (91A43) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Social learning (91D15)
Related Items (2)
A note on social learning in non-atomic routing games ⋮ Corrigendum to: ``Social learning in nonatomic routing games
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