Social learning in nonatomic routing games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.003MaRDI QIDQ2078068zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala

Publication date 25 February 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.11580

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationrouting gamesseries-parallel networksocial learningWardrop equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games involving graphs (91A43) Discrete-time games (91A50) Social learning (91D15)

Abstract: We consider a discrete-time nonatomic routing game with variable demand and uncertain costs. Given a routing network with single origin and destination, the cost function of each edge depends on some uncertain persistent state parameter. At every period, a random traffic demand is routed through the network according to a Wardrop equilibrium. The realized costs are publicly observed and the public Bayesian belief about the state parameter is updated. We say that there is strong learning when beliefs converge to the truth and weak learning when the equilibrium flow converges to the complete-information flow. We characterize the networks for which learning occurs. We prove that these networks have a series-parallel structure and provide a counterexample to show that learning may fail in non-series-parallel networks.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(3)

• Corrigendum to: ``Social learning in nonatomic routing games
• A note on social learning in non-atomic routing games
• Distributed learning of equilibria in a routing game

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