Weak and strong merging of opinions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90037-XzbMath0789.90022OpenAlexW1988043312MaRDI QIDQ1317318

Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 24 March 1994

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90037-x

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningconvergence to equilibriuminfinite gamesmergingdynamic economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (35)

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Cites Work

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• An approach to consensus and certainty with increasing evidence
• On the consistency of Bayes estimates
• Agreeing to disagree
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
• Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information

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