Social learning in recurring games
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Publication:1378019
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0583zbMath0891.90186OpenAlexW2036225920MaRDI QIDQ1378019
Ehud Kalai, Matthew O. Jackson
Publication date: 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1138.pdf
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