On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 232878 (Why is no real title available?)
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
- Large Robust Games
- Learning to play Bayesian games.
- On non-Nash equilibria
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Social learning in recurring games
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
Cited in
(5)- Redefinition of belief distorted Nash equilibria for the environment of dynamic games with probabilistic beliefs
- Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games
- Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information
- Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
- The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments
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