On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information

DOI10.1007/S00182-008-0146-1zbMATH Open1211.91014OpenAlexW2013176681MaRDI QIDQ532667FDOQ532667

Authors: Yaron Azrieli 

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0146-1

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zbMATH Keywords

pure strategy equilibriumconjectural equilibriumnon-manipulable information structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Learning to play Bayesian games.
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Large Robust Games
• Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
• Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On non-Nash equilibria
• Social learning in recurring games
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium

Cited In (5)

• Redefinition of belief distorted Nash equilibria for the environment of dynamic games with probabilistic beliefs
• Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games
• Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information
• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
• The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments

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