Social learning in recurring games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4141836 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 232878 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bayesian learning in normal form games
- Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 2
- Learning from others: A welfare analysis
- Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
- Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
- Non-cooperative games
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Repeated large games with incomplete information
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
- Stochastic Games
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
- Weak and strong merging of opinions
Cited in
(21)- Social learning with coordination motives
- Learning to coordinate in social networks
- Bargaining and network structure: an experiment
- Cyclic games: An introduction and some examples
- When is intergroup herding beneficial?
- Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games.
- Reputation versus social learning
- Social learning in a common interest voting game
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- Learning to play Bayesian games.
- Learning a population distribution
- Optimizing information in the herd: Guinea pigs, profits, and welfare
- Markovian persuasion
- Trust and trustworthiness in networked exchange
- On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information
- Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
- Payoff externalities and social learning
- Markovian persuasion with stochastic revelations
- Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
- Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games
- A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making
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