On the convergence of beliefs within populations in games with learning

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2298MaRDI QIDQ1371193zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Niels Anthonisen

Publication date 28 October 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2298

zbMATH Keywords

fixed normal-form gamelearning rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Recommendations

• Learning a population distribution
• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1568776

Cites work

• Fictitious play property for games with identical interests
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 410740 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1022658 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning mixed equilibria
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• On the nonconvergence of fictitious play in coordination games
• Potential games
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

Cited in

(5)

• Social learning in recurring games
• Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
• Learning a population distribution
• Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games
• Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play

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