scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1568776

MaRDI QIDQ4762295zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Dean P. Foster, H. Peyton Young

Publication date 13 January 2002

zbMATH Keywords

gameshazy beliefslearning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Review text

The authors consider a game that is played infinitely often by a set of boundedly rational players. Before each period, each agent has a belief about the strategies that his opponents will use in that period. These beliefs are derived by observing the play of the game so far, that is, they are continued on the information contained in the history of the play together with the initial conditions such as prior beliefs. They suppose further that the players are myopically rational (they choose a best reply given their beliefs in each period). The authors examine whether such players can learn to play the stage game over time. The authors show some results and theorems. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0952.00071].

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