Reputation versus social learning

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2538MaRDI QIDQ1125566zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthew O. Jackson, Ehud Kalai

Publication date 6 December 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2538

zbMATH Keywords

reputationfinitely repeated gameBayesian recurring gamesequilibrium play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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• A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054801 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1568776 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• Bayesian learning in repeated games
• Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games
• Evolutionary stability in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Learning mixed equilibria
• Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to Nash equilibrium: The almost absolute continuity hypothesis
• Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Repeated large games with incomplete information
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Social learning in recurring games
• Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria

Cited in

(4)

• Bounded memory and permanent reputations
• Learning in Games
• Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games.
• The dynamics of collective reputation

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