Evolutionary stability in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0012zbMath0849.90138OpenAlexW2010995172MaRDI QIDQ1916292

Ross Cressman

Publication date: 3 July 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0012

zbMATH Keywords

repeated prisoner's dilemmadynamic evolutionary stabilitymutual defection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (13)

On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria ⋮ Dynamic stability in symmetric extensive form games ⋮ Reputation versus social learning ⋮ When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation? ⋮ Cooperative teaching and learning of actions ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting. ⋮ Cycles of learning in the centipede game ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Hawks and doves in heterogeneous environments ⋮ Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies ⋮ Strategy abundance in evolutionary many-player games with multiple strategies ⋮ The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction ⋮ Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play

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