Cycles of learning in the centipede game
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Publication:1972850
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Cites work
- ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
- Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
- Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Evolutionary stability in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
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- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
- The Evolution of Conventions
Cited in
(10)- Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
- The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
- Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games
- Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
- ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
- Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies
- Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play
- Towards a rigorous framework for studying 2-player continuous games
- Infinitely repeated games with self-control: a dual-self interpretation of The Monks Story
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