In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3460178 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?
- Evolution in games with a continuous action space
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- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
- Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games
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- Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences.
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- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
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- The Evolution of Conventions
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- The evolution of cooperation
- The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
- The logic of animal conflict
- Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
Cited in
(15)- Hamilton's rule
- Symmetric paths and evolution to equilibrium in the discounted prisoners' dilemma
- Invasion dynamics of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Observable instability for the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1991075 (Why is no real title available?)
- In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs
- Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions
- The folk theorems in the framework of evolution and cooperation
- Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- To catch a stag: identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games
- The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen.
- Evolution and the ultimatum game
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