In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.11.007zbMATH Open1369.91019DBLPjournals/jet/GarciaV16OpenAlexW2141288980WikidataQ57622197 ScholiaQ57622197MaRDI QIDQ899680FDOQ899680

Julián Garcia, Matthijs van Veelen

Publication date: 30 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.007

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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesevolutionary game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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Cited In (13)

• An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen.
• Evolution and the ultimatum game
• Invasion dynamics of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Observable instability for the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• The folk theorems in the framework of evolution and cooperation
• To catch a stag: identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games
• Hamilton's rule
• Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user
• In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions

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