Evolutionary equilibria: Characterization theorems and their implications

DOI10.1023/A:1005083323183MaRDI QIDQ1273247zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jonathan Bendor, Piotr Swistak

Publication date 6 December 1998

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005083323183

zbMATH Keywords

evolution of cooperationevolutionary equilibriaevolutionary game theoryevolutionary stable strategiesIPDiterated prisoner's dilemmaTFTtit for tat

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

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• Evolution in a general equilibrium framework
• Generalized backward induction: justification for a folk algorithm
• Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.
• Common interest and signaling games: a dynamic analysis
• The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions
• In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.

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