The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions

DOI10.1007/s11238-005-6014-6zbMath1098.91018MaRDI QIDQ850474

Peter M. Todd, Jörg Rieskamp

Publication date: 3 November 2006

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-6014-6

zbMATH Keywords

repeated games; bargaining; finite state automata; investment game; evolutionary stable strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

91A22: Evolutionary games

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