Evolutionarily stable co-operative commitments

DOI10.1023/A:1026570914311zbMath0970.91014OpenAlexW202732817MaRDI QIDQ5925962

Güth, Werner, Kliemt, Hartmut

Publication date: 23 October 2001

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1026570914311

zbMATH Keywords

trustincomplete contractsindirect evolutionintrinsic motivationsignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (7)

The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions ⋮ Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?-an experimental analysis ⋮ Delayed and inconsistent information and the evolution of trust ⋮ Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information ⋮ Incentives in the family II: behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling ⋮ Evolution of mindsight and psychological commitment among strategically interacting agents ⋮ EXPLAINING PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS BY CONDITIONAL COOPERATION: AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

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