Evolution of mindsight and psychological commitment among strategically interacting agents

DOI10.3390/G7030027MaRDI QIDQ725040zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dimitry Rtischev

Publication date 1 August 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g7030027

zbMATH Keywords

ultimatum gametrust gametheory of mindact-rationalityevolution of preferencesmindsightpsychological commitmentrule-rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cognitive psychology (91E10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Evolution of theories of mind
• EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES
• Evolutionary game dynamics of controlled and automatic decision-making
• Evolutionary selection of socially sensitive preferences in random matching environments

Cites work

• Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis
• Evolution of Preferences1
• Evolution of theories of mind
• Evolutionarily stable co-operative commitments
• Game theory evolving. A problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction
• The calculus of selfishness.
• What to maximize if you must

Cited in

(2)

• The role of implicit motives in strategic decision-making: computational models of motivated learning and the evolution of motivated agents
• Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli

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