Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.011zbMath1419.91092arXiv2006.15308OpenAlexW3021414691WikidataQ129182319 ScholiaQ129182319MaRDI QIDQ1735746

Erik Mohlin, Yuval Heller

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.15308

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyevolution of preferencesdeceptiondepth of reasoningtheory of mindindirect evolutionary approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Individual preferences (91B08) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (4)

Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Evolution of preferences in multiple populations ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games

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