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Related Items

Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Deep and shallow thinking in the long run, Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, Stability and trembles in extensive-form games, Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli, A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games, RULE RATIONALITY, Limited foresight equilibrium

Cites Work

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Evolution of theories of mind
Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end
Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise
Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining
Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
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On evolutionarily stable sets
A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
On stability of perfect equilibrium points
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games
Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games
Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen.
The survival value of assuming others to be rational
On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
Stability and trembles in extensive-form games
Limited Foresight May Force Cooperation
The Evolution of Cooperation
Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
Sequential Equilibria
Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known
Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.
The Logic of Animal Conflict
Evolution of Preferences1
Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces