Three steps ahead
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Publication:4586085
DOI10.3982/TE1660zbMATH Open1395.91044MaRDI QIDQ4586085FDOQ4586085
Authors: Yuval Heller 
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
Cites Work
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Cited In (10)
- Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Rule rationality
- Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
- Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
- A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
- Stability and trembles in extensive-form games
- Limited foresight may force cooperation
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Limited foresight equilibrium
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