Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

DOI10.1073/PNAS.92.8.3596MaRDI QIDQ4833860zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jonathan Bendor, Piotr Swistak

Publication date 22 May 1995

Published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.92.8.3596

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral rulesconditionally cooperative strategiesevolutionary game theoryevolutionary robustnessevolutionary stability of cooperationevolutionary stable strategiesiterated prisoner's dilemmarepeated gamestit for tat

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Animal behavior (92D50)

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• Perfect reciprocity is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Hamilton's rule
• In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs
• Direct reciprocity in structured populations
• The evolution of cooperation
• Altruistic aging: the evolutionary dynamics balancing longevity and evolvability
• Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1991075 (Why is no real title available?)
• Three steps ahead
• ON THE SURVIVAL OF COOPERATION UNDER DIFFERENT MATCHING SCHEMES
• Fault-tolerant strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations
• An escape from ``the prisoner's dilemma
• In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
• A graphic measure for game-theoretic robustness

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