Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

DOI10.1073/pnas.92.8.3596zbMath0820.92016OpenAlexW1989258407WikidataQ34458198 ScholiaQ34458198MaRDI QIDQ4833860

Jonathan Bendor, Piotr Swistak

Publication date: 22 May 1995

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.92.8.3596

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesevolutionary game theoryiterated prisoner's dilemmaevolutionary robustnessevolutionary stable strategiestit for tatbehavioral rulesconditionally cooperative strategiesevolutionary stability of cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Animal behavior (92D50)

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