In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.02.013MaRDI QIDQ2416638zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Matthijs van Veelen, Julián Garcia

Publication date 24 May 2019

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://papers.tinbergen.nl/12089.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesWright-Fisher processneutrally stable strategyrobust against indirect invasionsuniform invasion barriercomplexity costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Direct reciprocity in structured populations
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• Evolutionarily stable sets
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences.
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Game theoretical foundations of evolutionary stability
• In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
• In defense of DEFECT.
• On evolutionarily stable sets
• Probability Models for DNA Sequence Evolution
• Robustness against indirect invasions
• Supergames played by finite automata with finite costs of complexity in an evolutionary setting
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• The logic of animal conflict
• Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

Cited in

(1)

• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.

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