In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.02.013zbMATH Open1411.91078OpenAlexW3123555401WikidataQ128992702 ScholiaQ128992702MaRDI QIDQ2416638FDOQ2416638
Authors: Matthijs van Veelen, Julián Garcia 
Publication date: 24 May 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/12089.pdf
Recommendations
repeated gamesWright-Fisher processneutrally stable strategyrobust against indirect invasionsuniform invasion barriercomplexity costs
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