In defense of DEFECT.

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0893zbMath1035.91015MaRDI QIDQ1864806

Oscar Volij

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/dee3737b33683c26965b9ee16815aca47f9dac53

zbMATH Keywords

finite automata; defection; Prisoners' dilemma; machine game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

91A22: Evolutionary games

68Q99: Theory of computing

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