Robustness against indirect invasions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.05.010MaRDI QIDQ665109zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthijs van Veelen

Publication date 5 March 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategyMoran processreplicator dynamicsstochastic dynamicsasymptotically stablefixation probabilitydirect invasionevolutionarily stable setindirect invasionneutral mutantneutrally stable strategyrobust against equilibrium entrantsrobust against indirect invasions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 43585 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
• Evolutionarily stable sets
• Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.
• Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• On evolutionarily stable sets
• On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
• The logic of animal conflict

Cited in

(15)

• An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
• On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
• In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
• Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
• Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
• When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation?
• Instability of belief-free equilibria
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs
• Sets resilient to erosion
• Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions
• Direct reciprocity in structured populations
• Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations
• Evolutionary stability against multiple mutations
• Robustness against indirect invasions in asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Dynamo

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