Robustness against indirect invasions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.010zbMath1279.91032MaRDI QIDQ665109

Matthijs van Veelen

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamics; stochastic dynamics; evolutionarily stable strategy; Moran process; asymptotically stable; fixation probability; direct invasion; evolutionarily stable set; indirect invasion; neutral mutant; neutrally stable strategy; robust against equilibrium entrants; robust against indirect invasions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A22: Evolutionary games

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Uses Software

• Dynamo

Cites Work

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