Robustness against indirect invasions
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.05.010zbMATH Open1279.91032OpenAlexW1997307718MaRDI QIDQ665109FDOQ665109
Authors: Matthijs van Veelen 
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.010
Recommendations
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Cited In (15)
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
- In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
- Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
- Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
- When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation?
- In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Instability of belief-free equilibria
- Sets resilient to erosion
- Direct reciprocity in structured populations
- Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions
- Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations
- Robustness against indirect invasions in asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces
- Evolutionary stability against multiple mutations
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