When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation?
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Publication:2183970
DOI10.3390/g10010004zbMath1443.91051OpenAlexW2910353074WikidataQ128569120 ScholiaQ128569120MaRDI QIDQ2183970
Mathias Spichtig, Martijn Egas
Publication date: 27 May 2020
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g10010004
Cites Work
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- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
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- Direct reciprocity in structured populations
- Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
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