Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games

DOI10.1073/pnas.0808450106zbMath1202.91029OpenAlexW2160756447WikidataQ37070520 ScholiaQ37070520MaRDI QIDQ3066179

Hannelore De Silva, Karl Sigmund, Martin A. Nowak, Arne Traulsen, Christoph Hauert

Publication date: 9 January 2011

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0808450106

zbMATH Keywords

cooperation mutation rates finite populations costly punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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