The evolution of coercive institutional punishment

DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0020-9zbMATH Open1273.91057OpenAlexW3123110199MaRDI QIDQ367475FDOQ367475

Authors: A. Isakov, David G. Rand 

Publication date: 16 September 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0020-9

Recommendations

• Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
• Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
• Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
• Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theorycoercioninstitutional punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
• Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
• Positive interactions promote public cooperation
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Cited In (10)

• The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments*
• Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
• Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
• The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• Rewards based on public loyalty program promote cooperation in public goods game
• Torture and the Commitment Problem
• Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas
• Conditions for cooperation and trading in value-cost dynamic games
• On the evolutionary origins of life-course persistent offending: A theoretical scaffold for Moffitt's developmental taxonomy

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