The evolution of coercive institutional punishment

DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0020-9MaRDI QIDQ367475zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors A. Isakov, David G. Rand

Publication date 16 September 2013

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0020-9

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theorycoercioninstitutional punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Recommendations

• Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
• Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
• Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
• Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment

Cites work

• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
• Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
• Positive interactions promote public cooperation
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment

Cited in

(10)

• Conditions for cooperation and trading in value-cost dynamic games
• The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments*
• Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
• Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
• The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• Rewards based on public loyalty program promote cooperation in public goods game
• Torture and the Commitment Problem
• Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas
• On the evolutionary origins of life-course persistent offending: A theoretical scaffold for Moffitt's developmental taxonomy

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