Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1790706
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.06.014zbMath1397.91063arXiv1306.4782OpenAlexW2016071235WikidataQ45950846 ScholiaQ45950846MaRDI QIDQ1790706
Thilo Gross, Xiaojie Chen, Ulf Dieckmann
Publication date: 4 October 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.4782
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