Reciprocal rewards promote the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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Publication:2232836
Cites work
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Cited in
(5)- Promotion of cooperation induced by discriminators in the spatial multi-player donor-recipient game
- Impact of multi-step punishment on the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Learning ability driven by majority selection enhances spatial reciprocity in prisoner's dilemma game
- Intergroup-based public goods games in complex networks with leader-driven other-regarding preferences
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