The evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games with heterogeneous relationships

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2015.01.028zbMath1400.91084OpenAlexW2002707806MaRDI QIDQ1618326

Ruipu Deng, Bo Xu, Miao Li

Publication date: 13 November 2018

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2015.01.028

zbMATH Keywords

tie strengthspatial prisoner's dilemma gameheterogeneous relationship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (6)

Moran-evolution of cooperation: from well-mixed to heterogeneous complex networks ⋮ The emergence of cooperation in tie strength models ⋮ Successful initial positioning of non-cooperative individuals in cooperative populations effectively hinders cooperation prosperity ⋮ A synergy of punishment and extortion in cooperation dilemmas driven by the leader ⋮ Reciprocal rewards promote the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ The influence of quasi-cooperative strategy on social dilemma evolution

Cites Work

• Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
• Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games

This page was built for publication: The evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games with heterogeneous relationships