Effects of three-faced strategy on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma
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Publication:6539641
Cites work
- Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
- Conditional neutral punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Cooperation dynamics based on reputation in the mixed population with two species of strategists
- Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
- Effects of defensive cooperation strategy on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma
- Evolution of extortion in iterated prisoner's dilemma games
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
- Public goods games with reward in finite populations
- Reciprocal reward promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations
- Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations
- Reputation-based adaptive adjustment of link weight among individuals promotes the cooperation in spatial social dilemmas
- Role of memory effect in the evolution of cooperation based on spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
- The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
- The evolution of cooperation
- The evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games with heterogeneous relationships
- The influence of quasi-cooperative strategy on social dilemma evolution
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