Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion

DOI10.1063/1.5051422zbMATH Open1457.91077arXiv1812.10124OpenAlexW3098091053WikidataQ58589892 ScholiaQ58589892MaRDI QIDQ4556532FDOQ4556532

Authors: Linjie Liu, Shengxian Wang, Xiaojie Chen, Matjaž Perc 

Publication date: 16 November 2018

Published in: Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Pro-social punishment and exclusion are common means to elevate the level of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the combined use of these two strategies is quite common across human societies. However, it is still not known how a combined strategy where punishment and exclusion are switched can promote cooperation from the theoretical perspective. In this paper, we thus propose two different switching strategies, namely peer switching that is based on peer punishment and peer exclusion, and pool switching that is based on pool punishment and pool exclusion. Individuals adopting the switching strategy will punish defectors when their numbers are below a threshold and exclude them otherwise. We study how the two switching strategies influence the evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game. We show that an intermediate value of the threshold leads to a stable coexistence of cooperators, defectors and players adopting the switching strategy in a well-mixed population, and this regardless of whether the pool-based or the peer-based switching strategy is introduced. Moreover, we show that the pure exclusion strategy alone is able to evoke a limit cycle attractor in the evolutionary dynamics, such that cooperation can coexist with other strategies.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.10124

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zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicspublic goods gameswitching strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

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Cited In (38)

• A remanufacturing duopoly game based on a piecewise nonlinear map: analysis and investigations
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• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment
• Public goods game with the interdependence of different cooperative strategies
• Public goods game on coevolving networks driven by the similarity and difference of payoff
• Multiple learning mechanisms promote cooperation in public goods games with project selection
• Eco-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the presence of policing
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in \(N\)-person snowdrift games with peer punishment and individual disguise
• Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game
• The evolutionary public goods game model with punishment mechanism in an activity-driven network
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a corrupt society with anti-corruption control
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• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies
• Reputation-based conditional compassion promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games
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