Cost optimisation of hybrid institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations

DOI10.1007/S00285-023-02011-6MaRDI QIDQ6070686zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Manh Hong Duong, C. M. Durbac, The Anh Han

Publication date 23 November 2023

Published in Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.08823

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Abstract: In this paper, we rigorously study the problem of cost optimisation of hybrid institutional incentives (combination of reward and punishment) for maximising the level (or guaranteeing at least a certain level) of cooperative behaviour in a well-mixed, finite population of self-regarding individuals where players interact via cooperation dilemmas (Donation Game or Public Goods Game). We show that a mixed incentive scheme can offer a more cost-efficient approach for providing incentives while ensuring the same level or standard of cooperation in the long-run. We establish the asymptotic behaviour (namely weak selection, strong selection, and infinite-population limits). We prove the existence of a phase transition, obtaining the critical threshold of the strength of selection at which the monotonicity of the cost function changes and providing an algorithm for finding the optimal value of the individual incentive cost. Our analytical results are illustrated with numerical investigations. Overall, our analysis provides novel theoretical insights into the design of cost-efficient institutional incentive mechanisms for promoting the evolution of cooperation in stochastic systems.

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Cited in

(9)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5575806 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal incentives for collective intelligence
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• Evolution of commitment in the spatial public goods game through institutional incentives
• Cost optimisation of individual-based institutional reward incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations
• Threshold incentive mechanisms for the sustainable management of public resources
• Incentive control of eco-evolutionary dynamics with environmental feedback
• Impact of human adherence level to control measures on cystic echinococcosis transmission
• Social welfare optimisation under institutional reward and punishment

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