Does spending more always ensure higher cooperation? An analysis of institutional incentives on heterogeneous networks

DOI10.1007/s13235-023-00502-1arXiv2301.06620OpenAlexW4362557107MaRDI QIDQ6124787

The Anh Han, Francisco C. Santos, Theodor Cimpeanu

Publication date: 2 April 2024

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.06620

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryincentivescost efficiencyevolution of cooperationprisoners' dilemmascale-free networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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