Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.cnsns.2019.104914OpenAlexW2957190727MaRDI QIDQ2207091

Shengxian Wang, Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki

Publication date: 22 October 2020

Published in: Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.10989

zbMATH Keywords

control theoryevolutionary game dynamicsevolution of cooperationpublic goods game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22) Hamilton-Jacobi equations in optimal control and differential games (49L12)

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