Promoting cooperation by punishing minority
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1740441
Abstract: Punishment is an effective way to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. In most of previous studies, objects of punishment are set to be defectors. In this paper, we propose a mechanism of punishment, in which individuals with the majority strategy will punish those with the minority strategy in a public goods game group. Both theoretical analysis and simulation show that the cooperation level can be greatly enhanced by punishing minority. For no punishment or small values of punishment fine, the fraction of cooperators continuously increases with the multiplication factor. However, for large values of punishment fine, there exists a critical value of multiplication factor, at which the fraction of cooperators suddenly jumps from 0 to 1. The density of different types of groups is also studied.
Recommendations
- Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game
- Synergy punishment promotes cooperation in spatial public good game
- Spontaneous punishment promotes cooperation in public good game
- Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
Cites work
- Does coevolution setup promote cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game?
- Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
- Inferring the reputation enhances the cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent lattices
- Memory-based prisoner's dilemma game with conditional selection on networks
- Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game
- Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation
- Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Statistical physics of vaccination
Cited in
(54)- Critical thresholds of benefit distribution in an extended snowdrift game model
- Spontaneous punishment promotes cooperation in public good game
- Symbiotic behaviour in the public goods game with altruistic punishment
- Emotion-based renewal strategies to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
- Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
- Effect of collective influence on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games
- Public goods game with the interdependence of different cooperative strategies
- Public goods game on coevolving networks driven by the similarity and difference of payoff
- Scaled group consensus in agent networks with finite sub-networks under continuous/discrete-time settings
- Cleverly handling the donation information can promote cooperation in public goods game
- An improved social force model for pedestrian dynamics in shipwrecks
- Effects of enhancement level on evolutionary public goods game with payoff aspirations
- Evolutionary dynamics in spatial threshold public goods game with the asymmetric return rate mechanism
- Simulating the dynamical features of evacuation governed by periodic vibrations
- The effects of attribute persistence on cooperation in evolutionary games
- Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation
- Benefits of intervention in spatial public goods games
- Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations
- Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
- Effects of interdependent network reciprocity on the evolution of public cooperation
- Environmental-based defensive promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Effects of quasi-defection strategy on cooperation evolution in social dilemma
- Synergy punishment promotes cooperation in spatial public good game
- Cooperation, punishment and immigration
- Memory-based conformity enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
- The rise and fall of donation behavior through reputation
- Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
- Coevolution of multi-game resolves social dilemma in network population
- Mercenary punishment in structured populations
- Transcendental behavior and disturbance behavior favor human development
- Uncertain coalition structure game with payoff of belief structure
- Group rewarding can promote cooperation and save costs in public goods games
- Evolution of cooperation in a conformity-driven evolving dynamic social network
- Resonance-like cooperation due to transaction costs in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
- Bidirectional supervision: an effective method to suppress corruption and defection under the third party punishment mechanism of donation games
- Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game
- The rise and fall of cooperation in populations with multiple groups
- Heterogeneous investments induced by historical payoffs promote cooperation in spatial public goods games
- Reputation evaluation with tolerance and reputation-dependent imitation on cooperation in spatial public goods game
- Positive correlation between strategy persistence and teaching ability promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games
- The role of alliance cooperation in spatial public goods game
- An evolutionary game with revengers and sufferers on complex networks
- Stability analysis of imitative dynamics in two-community with multiple delays
- Synergy and discount of punishment in the public goods game
- Bifurcation analysis of three-strategy imitative dynamics with mutations
- Payoff-based probabilistic interaction model on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game
- Evolutionary game dynamics of combining the payoff-driven and conformity-driven update rules
- Based on reputation consistent strategy times promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
- Between local and global strategy updating in public goods game
- Is cooperation sustained under increased mixing in evolutionary public goods games on networks?
- Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation
- The effect of similarity on the evolution of fairness in the ultimatum game
This page was built for publication: Promoting cooperation by punishing minority
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1740441)
