Is cooperation sustained under increased mixing in evolutionary public goods games on networks?
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Publication:2096342
DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2022.127604OpenAlexW4306657726MaRDI QIDQ2096342FDOQ2096342
Authors: Yanyan Li
Publication date: 16 November 2022
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2022.127604
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Cited In (4)
- Evolutionary games defined at the network mesoscale: the public goods game
- Fast cheater migration stabilizes coexistence in a public goods dilemma on networks
- Minimum cost control of weighted networked evolutionary games with switched topologies and threshold
- Public goods games on random hyperbolic graphs with mixing
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