Reputation evaluation with tolerance and reputation-dependent imitation on cooperation in spatial public goods game

DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2019.109517zbMATH Open1495.91058OpenAlexW2987676989WikidataQ126792846 ScholiaQ126792846MaRDI QIDQ2124281FDOQ2124281

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 8 April 2022

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2019.109517

zbMATH Keywords

tolerancereputationevolution of cooperationspatial public goods game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
• N‐person Prisoner's Dilemma†
• Promotion of cooperation due to diversity of players in the spatial public goods game with increasing neighborhood size
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Replicator dynamics of reward \& reputation in public goods games
• Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games
• The influence of age-driven investment on cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Individual choice and reputation distribution of cooperative behaviors among heterogeneous groups
• Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game
• When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners' dilemma game?
• Evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with adaptive reputation assortment
• Prisoner's dilemma game on reputation-based weighted network
• Winner-weaken-loser-strengthen rule leads to optimally cooperative interdependent networks
• Promotion of cooperation induced by heterogeneity of both investment and payoff allocation in spatial public goods game
• Promoting cooperation by punishing minority
• Reputation-based coevolution of link weights promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• An improved public goods game model with reputation effect on the spatial lattices
• Continuous spatial public goods game with self and peer punishment based on particle swarm optimization
• Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations
• Evolution of cooperation on independent networks: the influence of asymmetric information sharing updating mechanism
• Cleverly handling the donation information can promote cooperation in public goods game
• Reputation-based investment strategy promotes cooperation in public goods games
• The effect of increasing returns to scale in public goods investment on threshold values of cooperation under social exclusion mechanism

Cited In (13)

• Promoting cooperation by reputation scoring mechanism based on historical donations in public goods game
• Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation in a Corrupt Society with Anti-Corruption Control
• Reputation preferences resolve social dilemmas in spatial multigames
• Cooperation dynamics based on reputation in the mixed population with two species of strategists
• Evidential reasoning based on imitation and aspiration information in strategy learning promotes cooperation in optional spatial public goods game
• Reputation-based conditional compassion promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Reputation-based probabilistic punishment on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game
• Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
• High-reputation individuals exert greater influence on cooperation in spatial public goods game
• The role of alliance cooperation in spatial public goods game
• Evolution of cooperation in public goods games with dynamic resource allocation: a fairness preference perspective
• Effect of fairness-based sympathy and retaliation on cooperation in multi-player dilemma games
• How to evaluate one's behavior toward ‘bad’ individuals? Exploring good social norms in promoting cooperation in spatial public goods games

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