When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners' dilemma game?
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Publication:502956
DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2015.07.030zbMATH Open1353.91007OpenAlexW1270407644WikidataQ106508733 ScholiaQ106508733MaRDI QIDQ502956FDOQ502956
Publication date: 11 January 2017
Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2015.07.030
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Cites Work
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- Does a tag system effectively support emerging cooperation?
- A theory of group selection.
- Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games
- Promotion of cooperation due to diversity of players in the spatial public goods game with increasing neighborhood size
- Dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift games in structured populations
- Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games
- Promotion of cooperation induced by nonuniform payoff allocation in spatial public goods game
Cited In (13)
- Reputation-based co-evolutionary model promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game
- Reputation-dependent social learning on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
- Combining evolutionary game theory and network theory to analyze human cooperation patterns
- The evolutionary game of emotions considering the influence of reputation
- Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game
- Prisoner's dilemma game on reputation-based weighted network
- Structural effects of participation propensity in online collective actions: based on big data and Delphi methods
- External pressure on alliances: what does the prisoners' dilemma reveal?
- Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners' dilemma games
- Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on signed networks based on structural balance theory
- Individual choice and reputation distribution of cooperative behaviors among heterogeneous groups
- Reputation evaluation with tolerance and reputation-dependent imitation on cooperation in spatial public goods game
- Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks
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